How Republicans are Rigging Missouri’s Congressional Maps

Democrats expected Missouri’s referendum process to stop Republicans from gerrymandering the state further. Nine months and several lawsuits later, those expectations had shattered.

In 2024, Missouri elected a 6R-2D delegation^[1], with two Democrats in districts representing Kansas City and St. Louis. In September 2025, Republicans in the Missouri General Assembly passed a new 7R-1D map, cracking Kansas City across three districts^[2][3]. But the new map didn’t look like a fait accompli: Missouri is a state with citizen-initiated, simple-majority ballot propositions for statutes and amendments, and referendums to approve or reject laws passed by the Assembly.

The Missouri State Constitution^[4] says that for the people to use their “reserve[d] power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly” (art. III, § 49), “[a] referendum may be ordered either by petitions signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts, or by the general assembly” (art. III, § 52(a)). Then, “[a]ny measure referred to the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise” (art. III, § 52(b)) (emphasis added).

There are other statutes controlling the exact administrative process, but this was understood to mean that once a “referendum” petition reached the signature requirements and was submitted (“referendum may be ordered... by petitions signed”), the law in question would be suspended because it becomes the “measure referred to the people” and it “shall take effect when approved... and not otherwise.” This is why, after its passage in September, Politico reported that “[i]f they submit enough valid signatures, the state would be temporarily unable to enact the new maps.”^[5] Thus, Democrats raced to collect signatures for a measure to block the map and Republicans quickly looked for ways to invalidate or remove signatures^[6][7].

Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins (R) moved to sabotage the language on the proposed amendment^[8]. Then, Missouri AG Catherine Hanaway (R) tried to block the referendum in federal court on the basis that the U.S. Constitution prohibits referendums on congressional maps, but that case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction^[9]. When petitioners submitted their signatures, Hoskins claimed that the maps would go into effect anyway because the referendum petition can only suspend the law once he has verified its signatures and issued a certificate of sufficiency. He intended to withhold certification as long as possible. This is in spite of a precedent shown in 2017, when then-Secretary of State Jay Ashcroft (R) announced suspension of a right-to-work law immediately after receiving the necessary number of signatures on the referendum petition opposing it^[10]. In the last month of 2025, petitioners’ efforts had arrived at a standstill.

Hampering the referendum process and permitting the new maps anyway

There have been four tracks of legal challenges against the new map that are worth noting. The first legal challenge^[11] was originally filed on September 18th, with the claim that Hoskins, as Missouri Secretary of State, was delaying circulation of the referendum petition by overrunning statutory deadlines for reviewing preliminary petition filings. This reduces the circulation time because “referendum petitions,” once appropriately signed, must be submitted to the Secretary within 90 days of the Assembly adjourning following the session in which it passed the bill. In this case, the adjournment date was September 12th and thus the signature deadline was December 11th (art. III, § 52(a)). Therefore, the harm caused by intentional procedural delays would be shortening the effective time window for collecting signatures by making invalid those collected prior to some date.

The sets of signatures Hoskins claims are invalid and therefore cannot be counted are: (1) those collected prior to the governor signing the maps on September 28th and (2) those collected after September 28th but still before Hoskins approved the petition for circulation on October 14th^[12]. Whether or not it's legal for Hoskins to refuse to send those petition signatures for verification (the actual checking of signatures), or if an additional petition period is warranted as relief to the plaintiffs, the contested signatures account for only about one-third of the roughly 300,000 which were submitted on December 9th^[13] To qualify for the ballot, the measure only needed approximately 110,000 signatures across six of the state’s eight congressional districts (5% of voters in each). Local election officials would ultimately verify the requisite number by March 23rd^[14], but after the signatures were submitted on December 9th, the judge issued an abeyance order freezing this case until Hoskins issues a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency for the petition. Ultimately, the holdup would prove inconsequential in this suit, but Hoskins delaying his decision as long as possible eventually posed a considerable problem in the third case.

The second legal challenge^[15] was on the basis that the State Constitution limits the General Assembly to only enact one congressional map per decade, within the condition of time implied by the text: “When the number of representatives to which the state is entitled... under... each census... is certified to the governor, the general assembly shall by law divide the state into districts, which districts shall be... as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be” (art. III, § 45). The Supreme Court of Missouri (SCOMO) rejected this argument 4-3 on March 24th^[16].

The majority opinion takes a narrower reading of the text, arguing simply that “the word “when” does not mean “only when,””^[17] and therefore § 45 only requires the Assembly to redistrict after the state receives its apportionment following the census, and is not a prohibition on redistricting at other times. But § 45 also includes compactness and equal population requirements, so the dissent retorts that the majority’s interpretation would allow an absurdity: following the census, the Assembly could comply with § 45 once, then “come back the next day and draw districts flouting the criteria.”^[17] The dissent continues, arguing this interpretation would contradict the intentions of the framers from Missouri’s 1943-44 Constitutional Convention, whose statements in the record of that convention reflect their intent to include a once-a-decade restriction in the text of § 45. The majority opinion does not respond to these arguments.

The third legal challenge^[18] concerned Hoskins' contention, as the head election official in the state, that the referendum can only suspend the congressional district law when he gives certification. This was not the traditional understanding of Missouri's referendum process. Plaintiffs lost on the argument that suspension occurred at filing (but primarily on standing) at the Cole County Circuit on March 27th,^[19]and again on appeal to SCOMO on May 12th, which affirmed the lower state court ruling^[20].

In the opinion, the court spent several pages pretending to appeal to “the plain language of article III, sections 52(a) and 52(b)”[21] when refuting plaintiffs' argument. Still, SCOMO effectively decided that for the “petitions signed” to be requisite (art. III, § 52(a)), the Missouri Secretary of State must first certify the petition as sufficient. Therefore, “it is impossible to say as of this opinion” if the new maps went into effect on December 11th until the referendum petition is certified as sufficient or insufficient^[21].(Due to Article III, § 29, most laws passed by the Assembly in a session normally go into effect 90 days after adjournment, and December 11th was the normal effective date of the new maps.) But SCOMO also said that if “the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient… HB 1 [the new maps] did not take effect on December 11[th]” (emphasis mine)^[21] This reasoning suggests the law in question exists in some kind of limbo from the time of petition submission to the time of certification, but SCOMO said nothing about how the new maps should be treated. SCOMO also failed to address what it would mean for the law to have not been in effect when the laws concerning primaries depend on it prior to the date of certification. Correspondingly, Hoskins has claimed the new maps are the law and ordered local election officials to implement them ahead of the primary elections.

The latest and fourth legal challenge, filed on May 18th, grappled with this new absurdity^[22][23][24]. The same plaintiffs argued that Hoskins was required to issue a certificate promptly after he made a “determination” of the petition's sufficiency (by the language of § 116.150, RSMo)^[25]. Plaintiffs contend that skipping this step and implementing the election under the new maps, as though a certificate of insufficiency had been issued, also deprived plaintiffs of their right to judicial review of the certificate decision (§ 116.200, RSMo)^[26]. Even if Hoskins is not required to issue a certification yet, plaintiffs argued, SCOMO decided that the petition's sufficiency and the new maps’ status as law is unknowable. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs asked the Cole County Circuit to enjoin use of the new maps until Hoskins issues a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency. Hoskins' counsel has not meaningfully responded to these arguments, and the preliminary injunction hearing was delayed to July 15th without a written order. Presumably, there will be no answer on Missouri's congressional maps for at least another month, and primary ballots for military and overseas voters will be finalized before then^[27].

An obvious problem is created for Missouri's August 4th primaries; if Hoskins is not required to decide on the petition until August 4th (the deadline from § 116.150.3, RSMo),^[25] he will likely wait until that same primary election day, only to issue a certificate of insufficiency. That decision would be challengeable under § 116.200,^[26] and Hoskins would likely be ordered to reverse his decision because the facts would demonstrate that the referendum petition is sufficient. Even if he issues a certificate of sufficiency in the first place, Hoskins will likely claim that it's too late to suspend the new maps. Another case would then be brought before SCOMO to determine if the primary results must be voided. With a certificate of sufficiency, consistency with SCOMO's last ruling should mean the “not otherwise” clause of Article III, § 52(b) retroactively invalidates the August 4th primaries, as the maps “did not take effect.”^[21] However, the court’s prior opinions do not inspire any confidence in the sensibility of their future arguments, nor in their commitment to the rule of law.