Germany’s reconciliation with its Nazi past: It’s not what you think

Germany’s response to its Nazi past should be reconsidered in light of the rise of the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). In the 2025 federal election, 20.8 per cent of the vote was secured by the AfD party, twice its share in 2021. Germany’s experience of dictatorship and its subsequent historical education cannot therefore be treated as sufficient protection against renewed support for authoritarian nationalism. ^[1]

The relevance has been reinforced by the recent AfD email leaks. In ZDF’s reporting, they documented both internal complaints about Holocaust denial and an alleged attempt to sell a swastika flag at a party stall, and observed the difficulties experienced in removing the members involved. These cases show that Nazi sympathies and attempts to minimise Nazi crimes remain present within the party. The connection goes beyond a general similarity in nationalistic rhetoric: through these cases, continued sympathy for Nazi beliefs and attempts to minimise Nazi crimes are documented within the party. ^[2]

What should be expected from committed MAGA supporters after Trump’s departure, or from Putin’s supporters after his rule has ended? What can be learnt from Germany’s attempts to overcome Nazi sympathies?

It is often assumed that loyalty will be abandoned once a leader has been removed and the consequences of his rule have been exposed. Germany’s experience gives little reason for such confidence.

After 1945, the Nazi state was dismantled and its crimes were prosecuted and publicised. Yet its underlying ideology was still regarded favourably by many Germans. Political defeat was not immediately followed by a comparable change in beliefs. A more sustained confrontation with the past was developed over subsequent decades, against considerable resistance.

As shall be discussed, the assumption that Germany shed its Nazi past with immediacy following defeat in 1945 is a misconception.

Support after 1945: the evidence

One shocking finding was exposed through a post-war survey. Between November 1945 and August 1947, attitudes towards National Socialism were surveyed by the American occupation authorities. In November 1945, Nazism was described as a good idea badly implemented by 53 per cent of respondents. By August 1947, that figure had reached 55 per cent. Its rejection as a bad idea fell from 41 to 35 per cent over the same interval, although fluctuations were recorded between those dates. ^[3]

This is the literal opposite of what many assume to be the case.

It should be said that adults in the American occupation zone and the American and British sectors of Berlin were represented, rather than Germany as a whole. Nor can prewar and postwar support be directly compared through these figures. Nevertheless, no sustained decline in approval of Nazism’s underlying idea was recorded during this early postwar period. ^[3]

Thus, the assumption that Nazi ideology was widely rejected as soon as its consequences were made clear is contradicted by the evidence. The regime had been defeated, but substantial sympathy for its principles was retained, and even grew.

Responsibility could be avoided

By describing Nazism as a good idea badly implemented, its principles could be defended whilst responsibility was assigned to the way they had been applied. Support for the original project could thus be maintained without every action of the regime being endorsed.

This distinction is relevant to the question of political loyalty more generally. Failure can be attributed to particular decisions, incompetent officials or betrayal, rather than to the beliefs through which a movement was supported. Previous commitments need not then be reconsidered.

Private beliefs must also be distinguished from public statements. When open support becomes socially unacceptable or professionally damaging, its expression may be reduced without the belief itself being abandoned. Silence cannot be treated as proof of continued Nazi sympathy, but neither can it be accepted as evidence that such sympathy had disappeared.

Hence, claims of successful reconciliation should be assessed through changes in attitudes and conduct, rather than through the absence of public disagreement alone.

Former Nazis in public institutions

Continuity was also maintained within West German institutions. Through the Rosenburg investigation into the Federal Ministry of Justice, extensive former Nazi Party membership was documented among its senior officials. In 1957, the proportion reached 77 per cent. ^[4]

Party membership alone cannot be used to gauge an individual’s conduct or subsequent beliefs. Nevertheless, the commonly held belief that the nation’s Nazi past was promptly investigated and its influence comprehensively removed is incompatible with this evidence of institutional continuity.

The difficulty was therefore institutional as well as personal. A democratic state was being administered partly by people who had served under the dictatorship. Their previous careers and decisions could themselves have been subjected to investigation. Under these conditions, demands for accountability were liable to be resisted by some of those responsible for administering it.

Trials and resistance in the 1960s

A more public confrontation was advanced through criminal investigations. After the Ulm Einsatzgruppen trial in 1958, a central investigative office was established in Ludwigsburg. Further attention was directed towards Nazi crimes through the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961 and the first Frankfurt Auschwitz trial of 1963–65. Yet demands for a Schlussstrich, an end to further examination of the Nazi past, continued to be made. ^[5]

The extent of resistance was demonstrated during the 1965 debate over the approaching limitation deadline for Nazi murders. According to the Bundestag’s historical account, a narrow public majority was found by pollsters to favour allowing the deadline to expire. Twenty years after the war, the continuation of prosecutions was still contested. ^[6]

Legal objections to extending the deadline were also raised and should not all be interpreted as concealed support for Nazism. Nevertheless, a general willingness to pursue accountability cannot be assumed. Continued prosecution had to be secured through political argument and legislative decisions.

The generational challenge: a real change in mentality

By the late 1960s, the conduct of the older generation was being questioned more openly. Through student protests, attention was drawn to former Nazis in universities and public office. From 1966 to 1969, the West German chancellorship was held by Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a former Nazi Party member.

An important contribution to challenging public silence was made by the protest movement. However, the confrontation with Nazism had already been advanced through earlier investigations and public debates. It should not be attributed entirely to the generation associated with 1968. Nor was greater historical accuracy always achieved through protest: specific Nazi crimes were sometimes obscured by general accusations of fascism against contemporary institutions. ^[7]

Generational change was nevertheless significant. The records and authority of established figures could be questioned by people who had not been personally involved in the regime. A broader examination of responsibility could therefore be pursued without the same need to defend previous decisions.

Renewed debate in the 1970s

In January 1979, renewed public discussion was prompted by the West German broadcast of the American television drama Holocaust. Widespread distress and further debate about the Nazi past were provoked by the series, almost thirty-four years after the war. ^[8]

This should not be taken to mean that Nazi crimes had previously been unknown. Rather, the difference between access to information and a willingness to engage with its implications must be recognised. Evidence could be available whilst personal and collective responsibility continued to be avoided.

The argument that generational change was required for a broader reckoning is therefore substantially supported, particularly in West Germany. It should not, however, be treated as a precise timetable or a completed transformation. Change was brought about through investigations, prosecutions, public discussion and generational conflict. It was not produced by the passage of time alone.

Implications for Trump and Putin supporters

No equivalence with National Socialism is required for this lesson to be applied to other political movements with cultist-like characteristics. A sombre conclusion from the example of Germany is that the removal of Trump or Putin should not be expected to produce an immediate rejection of the beliefs associated with them.

Among committed supporters, responsibility may instead be assigned to advisers, opponents or supposed betrayal. The idea will still be described as ‘good, but badly implemented’. Some previous claims may be quietly abandoned, whilst the original movement continues to be defended. These are possibilities suggested by the historical comparison, rather than predictions established by the German surveys.

A change of leadership should therefore be distinguished from a change in political attitudes. This is only the first step in the process of normalisation of beliefs.

Evidence must be preserved, responsibility investigated and democratic institutions maintained. In the meantime, those with extreme ideas should exist in a political context in which these views become taboo, and the next generation is given the opportunity to form views independently of extremist influences. The risk from not learning this lesson is to rejoice at the overthrow of such figures as Trump and Putin without recognising that the work has only just begun.